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I. INTRODUCTION

No longer are just consumers, retailers, and marketers involved in
the chain of commerce affected on a daily basis by the technological
advances making our world a much smaller place. Today, educators are
confronted, on a daily basis, by high-tech communication devices in the
hands of their students. It had been assumed that such technology in the
hands of our young people would help them remain competitive in an
increasingly technological world. However, such technology may be
causing more trouble than good for the children of America. While
computers, PDAs, smartphones, and MP3 players are utilized by
teachers as an effective medium to teach students, such devices are also
being used by students to cheat in order to get ahead. Other apparent
problems are cell phones ringing in class and students communicating
to each other via text message during class.' While these may be some
initial concerns leading to hesitance by school administrators to allow
such devices to enter schools, a more growing concern that directly
I. Jennifer Dobson, Cell Phones: How to Deal with this New Classroom Problem, Al
ARTICLES, Aug. 9, 2010, http://www.alarticles.com/article_1687910_22.html.
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affects academia and personal lives is raising attention across the
country.2
The use of modem communications devices to mock, tease, imitate,
and coerce others (students, teachers, and/or administrators) is proving
to have an effect inside the schoolhouse gates, regardless of where the
communication originates. However, in contention with a school's
interest in properly teaching its students is the student's freedom of
speech under the U.S. Constitution, First Amendment. A student's
freedom of speech rights on school grounds are not the same as those of
the everyday American citizen. 3 Similar to the abbreviated rights
students have in regard to search and seizure on school property,4
students' speech rights are more restricted than those of protestors on
public streets or people writing editorial in public newspapers.
The overarching question facing the courts today is to what extent
may schools limit off-campus speech, emanating from off-campus
online social media outlets such as Facebook but which has an oncampus effect. Prior to the digital age, almost all speech that affected
the classroom originated in school or from a school related activity.
Technological advances have required the passage of new legislation to
combat cyberbullying. The freedom of speech issue is at the forefront of
new legislation being proposed, or already enacted, with the purpose of
curtailing destructive or hurtful communications by students.
Part II of this Article will explain the jurisdiction of public schools
as it applies to students' freedom of speech rights. Part II will start with
standard student free speech issues and analyze the four seminal
Supreme Court cases that lay out the current judicial posture regarding
freedom of speech rights in schools while also illustrating a school's
jurisdiction. Next, Part III will discuss the split in the Third Circuit
2. See Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools Into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2010, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style/28bully.html.
3. See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that
the school district acted within its authority in imposing sanctions on students who used lewd
language in a school speech).
4. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). The Court concluded, along with the
majority of courts,
that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain
order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that
searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search
has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a
student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search.
Id.
5. See Stephen Balkam, Protecting Kids While Protecting Free Speech, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER, Mar. 31, 2009.
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Court of Appeals, involving two similar cases, and then finally address
potential approaches the Supreme Court may take to tackle the issue of
technology affecting behavior in the classroom.
Part IV of this Article will address cyberbullying as it applies to free
speech issues and the criminal law landscape. As will be shown,
cyberbullying is becoming more and more prevalent in today's
increasingly interconnected online world, particularly among
kindergarten through twelfth grade students in public schools. 6 Incidents
of cyberbullying are occurring at such an accelerated rate on social
networking sites, such as Facebook and MySpace, that state legislatures
across the country are rapidly adopting measures to combat the
problem.7 Next, Part IV will discuss the different approaches to
cyberbullying in the school system and the criminal law system. Part IV
will then discuss how the criminal law establishment currently combats
cyberbullying and explain why the criminal law institution should take
further jurisdiction and discipline over cyberbullying incidents. Starting
with an analysis of the inadequacy of former and current cyberbullying
laws, Part IV will address and analyze what states have done across the
country to combat these innovative cyber victimization incidents.
Additionally, Part IV will take an in-depth look at the Florida Jeffrey
Johnston Act (Johnston Act) and in Part V, Federal Megan Meier Laws
(Meier Law) recently enacted to combat cyberbullying. Lastly, Part V
will close with a projection of what the future landscape of anticyberbullying laws may look like, while proposing solutions regarding
the criminal justice system in Florida, and at the federal level.
II. THE FOUR SEMINAL SUPREME COURT CASES DEFINING
SCHOOL SPEECH

A. Tinker v. Des Moines School District; The FormalBalancingTest
The usual starting point involving a student's free speech rights
begins with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District.8 In Tinker, in December 1965, two teenage boys and a teenage
girl wore black armbands to their public schools in Des Moines, Iowa as
sign of protest against the Vietnam War. 9 The principals at the Des
Moines schools became aware of the students' plan prior to them
6. See Cyberbullying Among Youngsters: Profiles of Bullies and Victims,
http://sageinsight.wordpress.com/2011/04/28/cyberbullying-among-youngsters-profiles-of-bulli
es-and-victims/ (last visited June 30, 2011).
7. See Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online PlaygroundSafefor Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REv. 845, 848-49 (2010).
8. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

9. Id. at 504.
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executing it and adopted a last minute policy that stated: "any student
wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he
refused he would be suspended until he returned without the
armband."' 0 The three students were aware of this policy and still wore
the armbands on December 16th and 17th, after the policy had taken
effect." As a result of wearing the armbands, all three students were
sent home and suspended from school until they would agree to return
not wearing the armbands.12 The students did not return to school until
after New Year's Day.13
Prior to the case reaching the Supreme Court, the District Court
dismissed the complaint brought forth by the three students.14 This
dismissal was affirmed without opinion by a divided Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals that sat en banc.I
At the Supreme Court, Justice Fortas' opinion emphasized the
following: "it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."l 6 He went on to say that freedom of speech rights
must be balanced against the safeguards that educators must impose to
control conduct in schools.17 The Court concluded that a balancing act
must be performed when weighing a student's First Amendment rights
with the policies invoked by school officials.' 8
The Fortas opinion focused on the substantiality of the disruption
within the school, grounding its decision from Burnside v. Byarsl9
which held conduct that would "materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of ap ropriate discipline in the operation of the
school" may be proscribed. The Court went on to state that if the
speech does not interfere with the day-to-day operations of the school or
with the individual rights of the students in the school, then no
restriction may be placed on the speech. 2 1 The Court further noted that
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. This is when the planned protest was scheduled to be over. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 506.
17. Id. at 507; see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109, (1968) (invalidating an
Arkansas statute that prohibited the teaching of evolution in the classroom of public schools).
18. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
19. See 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966).
20. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505. In Burnside, a group of students wore "freedom buttons" to
protest racial segregation in their state. 363 F.2d at 747. The school principal ordered the
students to remove the buttons because he thought it would lead to a commotion. Id. at 746-47.
The Fifth Circuit of Appeals held that school officials could not prohibit the students from
wearing the buttons because no evidence was shown that the wearing of the buttons would cause
a disruption. Id. at 747.
21. See Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749.
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the school in the instant case produced no evidence pointing to classes
being disrupted or any threats or acts of violence due to the students
wearing the armbands. 2 The Court then rejected the argument posed by
the School District (the same argument the District Court relied on in its
opinion) that the School District acted "based upon their fear of a
disturbance from the wearing of the armbands." 23 The Court went on to
state that such apprehension of a disturbance is not enough to supersede
the right to one's freedom of speech, on or off of school grounds.24 The
Court supported its argument by referring to the country's history, its
national strength, and the independence of Americans to be allowed to
think and express themselves freely. 25 Additionally, the Court stated
that when a school official is justified in prohibiting a particular kind of
speech, the school official "must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 26
Thus, if the school official is not able to show a valid school interest in
preventing a potential and actual disturbance at school while imposing a
valid restriction upon a student's First Amendment rights, the student is
entitled to express their views and opinions.2 7
In sum, the Tinker standard is the "formal balancing test" used to
determine if a school official has infringed on a student's right to free
speech, but as the cases below will demonstrate, limits are set as to how
far students can push the limits of their free speech.
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser; RestrictionsImposed Upon
Content ofFree Speech
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,2 8 Matthew Fraser, a
student at Bethel High School, gave a speech at a school-sponsored
student assembly, attended by approximately six hundred students,
nominating a fellow classmate for student office.2 9 The content of
Fraser's speech contained an "elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor." 30 As a result of his speech, Fraser was suspended for three
days because his conduct violated the school's student discipline code.3 1
22. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 508-09.
26. Id. at 509.
27. Id. at 511.
28. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
29. Id. at 677.
30. Id. at 678.
31. Id. The disciplinary rule is stated as "[c]onduct which materially and substantially
interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane
language or gestures." Id.
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In Fraser,the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision
and held in favor of the School District by stating the school district was
well within in their "permissible authority" to impose sanctions on
Fraser due to the content of his speech.32 The Court utilized the Tinker
standard to some degree but went beyond it by addressing the issue of a
"material disruption" of the classroom, stating that such behavior
conflicts with rights of other students. 33 The Court further implied that
more deference should be given to school officials when they are
stepping in to regulate speech that is unrelated to any political
viewpoint, thus possibly differentiating the levels of interference for
non-political speech as opposed to political speech on school grounds. 34
The First Amendment rights of students in public school "are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."35
The Court supported its decision by stating that vulgar and lewd speech
in schools is not within the purview of the First Amendment protection
because such speech would "undermine the school's basic educational
mission. ,036 By punishing the student, the school is disassociating itself
from such offensive speech that would directly conflict with the core
values and beliefs of public school education.
Differing from Tinker, the holding in Fraser distinguished the
punishing of a student for his non-politically motivated message at a
school sanctioned event from the protection of politically-motivated
speech at school. Additionally, the Court began to build its "sponsor vs.
tolerate" perspective,3 7 which is evinced and utilized more clearly in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.38
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier; Toleratingor Promoting
Student Speech?
In Hazelwood, three student members of the school newspaper
claimed their First Amendment rights were violated when school
officials chose to delete two pages of articles from the May 13, 1983
issue. 39 The newspaper was a school-sponsored extracurricular activity
that received money from the school and was overseen by school board
32. Id. at 685.
33. See id. at 680-81, 694.
34. See id. at 681.
35. Id. at 682.
36. Id. at 685.
37. The Court begins to lay the groundwork for their argument of when a school should
tolerate speech (Tinker) and when it will not (Fraserand Hazelwood). In this connotation, the
court sponsors the speech if they allow it on school grounds; hence, by not acting, they are
sponsoring the speech. In the cases mentioned above, the court talks about differentiating
between "sponsoring vs. tolerating" the speech.
38. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
39. Id. at 262.
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officials. 40 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
District Court's ruling, which held that the school newspaper was not a
part of the basic student curriculum and its main focus was to express
students' viewpoints. 4 1 Furthermore, the Appeals Court classified the
newspaper as a public forum, thus prohibiting school officials from
interfering with student speech except when necessary to avoid material
and substantial interference with classroom. 42 Additionally, the Appeals
Court stated school officials may censor school newspaper articles only
if an invasion of the rights of others is found to rise to the level of tort
liability; however, the Appeals Court found no such level of culpability
in this case.43
When the case made its way to the Supreme Court, the Court
focused on the difference between tolerating student speech and
promoting student speech.4 4 When a student's speech is conveyed
through a school-sponsored medium or publication, such as the school
newspaper, schools officials are "entitled to exercise greater control"
than in instances in which students convey a message though their own
medium "to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity
is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material
that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views
of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.""
The Court further explained that the same standard need not be applied
when determining when a school chooses not to lend its name to
endorse student expression.4 6 The Court went on to hold that a student's
First Amendment rights are not infringed upon when school officials
choose to censor certain articles as "long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 4 7
With Tinker setting the threshold as to why and to what degree a
school must tolerate student speech; Fraser goes beyond the Tinker
standard by granting school officials more deference over non-political
speech. Hazelwood then created the tolerate versus sponsor viewpoint
involving on-campus speech in a school-sponsored activity. Lastly,
40. Id. at 262-63.
41. Id. at 265.
42. Id. The Court of Appeals applies basic First Amendment rights in a public forum
while using the Tinker standard as an exception to punish the students if the facts warrant such
punishment. Id.
43. Id. at 265-66. (noting that the Court of Appeals created another exception where the
arm of the school can limit student speech).
44. Id. at 271-72.
45. Id. at 271 (differentiating between the Tinker students who expressed their opposition
to the war through personal expression by wearing armbands and the students in Hazelwood
who expressed their view in a school-sponsored medium or publication).
46. Id. at 272.
47. Id. at 273.
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Morse v. Frederick48 attempted to answer the question of if speech
occurring off-campus can result in punishment by a public school.
D. Morse v. Frederick; May Off-campus
Speech Be PunishedOn-campus?
Morse was the first case to deal with student speech originating offcampus. In Morse, a high school principal witnessed some of her
students displaying a banner containing a message which appeared to
endorse the use of illegal drugs, at a school-sponsored event, off of
school property.4 9 Instructing the students to take down the banner and
confiscating the banner, the principal suspended the one student who
refused to comply. 5 0 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's holding that a violation of the student's First Amendment
rights occurred. 5 ' The Appeals Court chose to apply a strict application
of the Tinker standard and held, even though the action took place at a
school-sponsored event, there was no evidence of a substantial and
material disruption of a school activity. 52
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a principal may restrict
student speech at a school-sponsored event when such speech may be
reasonably related to promoting illegal drug use.53 The Court focused on
the severity of the drug use problem in this country and stated the
promotion of illegal drugs was reasonably related to this problem. 54
Continuing its argument, the Court noted it is inherent that public
schools play an important role in the education of students to prevent
drug use.5 5 Consistent with the principles of the past cases-Tinker,
Fraser,and Hazelwood-the Morse Court focused on a "reasonableness
test." 56
Once again the Supreme Court chose to go down a line of reasoning
different from the Tinker standard set forth decades before. Even though
Morse expands the range of when schools may regulate student speech,
by including student speech which occurs outside the school walls at a
school-sponsored event, it does not provide clarity or answers to how
the broad Tinker standard should be applied because the Court chose to
utilize a reasonableness standard instead. In sum, depending on the facts
of the case, the Court may choose to utilize the Tinker standard or the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 397.
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Morse standard in its application of the law.
The chart below summarizes the key information from the four
seminal cases. 57
Case

Type of
Speech

Location
of Speech

School
Event

Evidence of
Interference
with School
Acknowledged

Apply
Tinker

Holding

Prevailing
Party

Tinker

Symbolic
Political
Speech

On
Campus

No

No

N/A

Student

Fraser

NonPolitical
Speech

On
Campus

Yes

Yes

Slight

Student speech
may be
regulated
when it will
lead to a
material and
substantial
disruption of
work and
discipline of
school
Constitutional
rights of
students are
not
coextensive of
adults
Tinker
Standard is not

Hazel
wood

NonPolitical
Speech

On
Campus

Yes

No

No

School

absolute

School
officials may
exercise
control over
student speech
so long as their
actions are
reasonably
related to
pedagogical
concerns.
Establishes
tolerate vs.
sponsor

School

viewpoint

57. This chart is a compilation of the four Supreme Court cases dealing with student
speech in public schools. It is meant as an illustrative guide to categorize the important facets of
each case.
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Case

Type of
Speech

Location
of Speech

School
Event

Evidence of
Interference
with School
Acknowledged

Apply
Tinker

Holding

Prevailing
Party

Morse

NonPolitical
Speech

Off
Campus

Yes

No

No

Student speech
may be
regulated at a
school
sponsored
event when
such speech
may be
reasonably
related to
promoting
illegal drug

School

use.

III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT SPLIT

A. (Cyber)Bullying Turns to Electronic
Communications and the Internet
With the backdrop of student free speech laid out, this Article now
turns to a new wave of cases involving electronic speech by students
which occur off-campus and are, arguably, not related to any school
activity. Recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rendered two
decisions in two seemingly similar cases, with different results, on the
same day.
1. J.S. v. Blue Mountain School Dist.; Disciplining Off-campus Speech
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,5 8 two eighth
graders created a fictitious Myspace.com 59 profile of their school's
principal, from a computer at home. 60 The fictitious profile painted the
principal, James McGonigle, as a bisexual, sex addict pedophile." After
discovering the profile, McGonigle met with the Superintendent and
Director of Technology for the school district with a printed copy of the

58. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), Rehearing en Banc
Granted,Opinion Vacated (Apr. 9, 2010).
59. A social networking website.
60. 593 F.3d at 290-91.
61. Seeid.at291.
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profile. 62 Subsequently, it was determined the two eighth graders
committed a serious infraction of the school's disciplinary code and
McGonigle informed the students that they would receive a ten-day
suspension from school.6 3
As a result of the suspension, one of the eighth graders, through her
parents, filed suit against the Blue Mountain School District claiming a
violation of her free speech rights, Due Process rights, rights under
Pennsylvania State Law, and her parents' Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights. 64 In the interest of brevity, this Article
will solely focus on the part of the decision regarding the student's free
speech rights. The District Court noted that the profile did not
"substantially and materially" disrupt school, but it did cause some
disruption.65 Ultimately, the case turned on the fact that the "lewd and
vulgar off-campus speech had an effect on-campus," and the District
Court ruled in favor of the School District. 66
On appeal, the Third Circuit held "off-campus speech that causes or
reasonably threatens to cause a substantial disruption of or material
interference with a school need not satisfy any eographical technicality
in order to be regulated pursuant to Tinker." By focusing its legal
analysis on the interaction between the creation of the fictitious
MySpace profile and the Middle School, 68 the Appeals Court pointed to
numerous disruptions including: disruptions inside the classroom,
canceling of student counseling sessions due to restructuring of
schedules, disturbances on-campus when the two eighth graders
returned to campus, and an overall deterioration of discipline in the
Middle School among the eighth grade student body. 9 The court then
went on to state that such minor disruptions could compound into a
much larger issue if not acted upon early enough. 7 0 Thus, it seems clear
that school officials are endowed with the inherent power to deter and
7
prevent potential disruption from occurring on-campus.
2. Layshock v. Hermitage School District
Similar to the case above, and decided on the same day, Layshock ex

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 292.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 294-95.
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id. at 301. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d at 293.
See id at 294.
See id. at 301-02.
See id at 302.
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rel. Layshock v. HermitageSchool District,72 involved a student using a
computer off-campus to create a fake MySpace profile of his high
school principal, Eric Trosch.7 3 As a result of creating the fake profile,
Layshock was in violation of the school discipline code and was
punished with a suspension from school.7 4
Layshock filed a suit in District Court that included a claim asserting
a violation of his First Amendment rights. The District Court entered
summary judgment in favor of Layshock on the First Amendment claim
because the school district "could not 'establish[] a sufficient nexus
between [Layshock]'s speech and a substantial disruption of the school
environment[]. "7 6 Instead of making an argument regarding the
relationship between the speech and the disruptions it caused or would
have caused on school grounds (the Tinker standard), the School
District attempted to show a nexus between the creation and distribution
of the speech and the School District permitting itself to regulate its
conduct, resting its analysis akin to Fraser.77 However, the conduct in
Fraser occurred on-campus, thus according to Fraser, no material
disruption need be shown. Here, because there was no finding of any
material or substantial disruption occurring or likely to occur as a result
of Layshock's speech, a school official's administrative arm can only
stretch as far as the schoolhouse gates and may not extend outside the
gates unless evidence of a disruption or potential disruption is shown.7 9
3. Why the Split?
The difference in rulings between these two factually similar cases
rested solely on the argument the School District chose to present in
Layshock. In Blue Mountain, the court overlooked the fact that the
speech occurred off-campus and implemented a straight forward Tinker
application based on the School District's argument of the multiple
disruptions occurring on-campus with the potential for further
substantial disruption to occur. Furthermore, by choosing to overlook
the fact the speech occurred off-campus, the Appellate Court gave
72. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), Rehearing en Banc
Granted,Opinion Vacated (Apr. 9, 2010).
73. Id. at 252.
74. Id. at 254.
75. Id. at 254-55.
76. Id. at 258, 264.
77. Id. at 259.
78. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599-600 (D. Pa. 2007)
(stating "[t]here is no evidence that Justin engaged in any lewd or profane speech while in
school."). See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
79. See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263; see also Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043,
1044-45 (2d Cir. 1979).
80. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 298 (3d Cir. 2010).
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greater weight to the disruptions or potential disruption occurring or that
could occur on-campus. 8
While in Layshock, however, the School District focused its
argument on the vulgarity of the off-campus speech to be sufficient
enough to warrant punishment without citing to any disruption
occurring (or that could occur) on-campus. 82 It appears the Third
Circuit's approach to regulating off-campus speech rested solely on its
effect, or potential effect, on-campus, a straight forward Tinker
application.
In sum, it is plausible that the Appellate Court understood the nuance
it was creating, which is why it issued both of these decisions on the
same day. Accordingly, the court used these two cases to highlight the
importance of the level of on-campus disturbance created by the offcampus speech.
B. Analyzing Off-Campus Speech's Effects in the Classroom
The inevitable question before us now is whether there is a standard
of analyzing speech occurring off-campus that effects work inside the
classroom, and if so, what is that standard? Prior to the modem
ubiquitous use of the Internet, courts were confronted solely with
regulating speech occurring on-campus or at a school-sponsored event.
The standard set forth in Tinker or the exceptions laid out in Fraser,
Hazelwood, and Morse all entailed speech occurring under the purview
of public schools. Today, however, public schools must grapple with
how to confront online speech originating off-campus that may cause
disruption inside school walls, especial speech that originates on the
Internet. There are a plethora of cases that offer examples of rulings
in favor of school districts where the school district was able to show a
sufficient nexus between the speech and a material and substantial
disruption in the classroom. If courts are going to shift their ideology
towards a pure Tinker standard when evaluating off-campus speech,
parameters must be meted as to what qualifies as a substantial
disruption to classroom activity. This approach will give school officials
greater latitude in administering punishment as the threshold school
81. Id.; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(stating if school officials are able to "demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led
[them] to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities").
82. See generally 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), Rehearing en Banc Granted, Opinion
Vacated (Apr. 9, 2010).
83. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
84. See generallyDoninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of.
Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d
847 (Pa. 2002).
85. See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 261-63.
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officials must meet is lowered substantially.
Furthermore, if no substantial disruption occurs because of the quick
action by school officials to address the problem early, what will
actually be deemed a potential substantial disruption within the school?
The standard set by Tinker gives school officials broad discretion in
determining when an actual disruption has occurred and if one is
foreseeable. Such power lends itself to a slippery slope because focus
is given to the effect of the speech without contemplating if the school
is empowered to punish the speaker.87 However, school officials may
not infringe on a student's freedom of expression if the school's action
is solely based on fear or apprehension.8 8 Expanding the school's
authority grants schools the power to oversee and discipline all aspects
of a student's life.8 9 So where will the line be drawn?
As we look forward from the analysis of the aforementioned cases in
mind, it may be said that courts grant great deference to school officials
in disciplining students whose non-political speech violates a well
established code of conduct rule, originating on or off-campus, where a
substantial nexus can be illustrated between a material substantial
disruption that has occurred or is likely foreseeable with the educational
mission or safety of other students in public schools. With a majority of
new Internet cases emanating under these circumstances, and the
Supreme Court yet to take a case involving online speech in public
schools, the courts will most likely take a step back and allow the
schools to continue to play judge, unless state legislatures step in to
regulate online speech, and ultimately cyberbullying. 90 Such an
approach allows schools to "balance the needs of a student's right to
self-expression and the school's need to maintain an orderly and safe
educational environment." 91 With more attention being drawn to the
issue of cyberbullying by lawsuits and media outlets, legislatures across
the country are trying to keep up with the consequences of these
emerging technological advances through legislative acts.

86. See Benjamin Heidlage, A Relational Approach to Schools' Regulation of Youth
Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 572, 583-84 (2009).
87. Id. at 584.
88. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
89. Heidlage, supra note 86, at 586.
90. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
91. Sandy S. Li, Notes & Comments, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The
Continued Threat to Internet-RelatedStudent Speech, 26 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 65, 102 (2005).
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LAW LIABILITY AMONG THE STATES

A. Cyberbullying Takes Legislative Form
Moving from traditional free speech issues such as those addressed
by Tinker, schools, states, and courts are presented with a new
phenomenon-namely online free speech issues when that online
speech is directed at hurting another. Cyberbullying is a recent
phenomenon accompanying the age of the Internet and virtual world.
According to the Department of Justice, 77% of middle school students
say they have been bullied or threatened by other kids on and offline. 92
To combat this new wave of bullying and ease the burden of
prosecution, many states have now altered their existing harassment
laws, or enacted "cyberstalking" or "cyberharassment" laws that
explicitly prohibit electronic forms of communication which is done
with an attempt to bully, harass, or demean another in the online
world.93 During the early years of the Internet, states would prosecute
cyberbullying culprits under traditional harassment laws. 4 These
traditional harassment laws, however, did not easily apply to harassment
which occurred via an electronic medium.9 5 In turn, this made the
prosecution of cyberbullies extremely difficult. Furthermore, these
traditional harassment laws which states and the federal government
used were garden-variety harassment laws that did not cover electronic
communications until the passage of the Federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA). 9 6 The CFAA was one of the first laws which
prosecuted individuals who used a computer in a fraudulent means.97
Other examples of early laws controlling electronic communication
were 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) which criminalized interstate threats and 47
U.S.C. § 223 which prohibited obscene or harassing phone calls through
interstate communications.98 While helpful, these laws were not
specifically designed to combat Internet cyberbullying in the virtual age
92. Juju Chang et al., Mom's Campaignfor FloridaAnti-Bully Law Finally Pays Off
ABCNEWS, May 2, 2008 http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=4774894&page=l [hereinafter

ABC].
93.

ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34651, PROTECTION OF CHILDREN

ONLINE: FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS ADDRESSING CYBERSTALKING, CYBERHARASSMENT, AND

CYBERBULLYING 6 (2008), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34651_20080905.pdf.
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id.; see also Shire Auerbach, Screening Out Cyberbullies: Remedies for Victims on
the Internet Playground,30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1641 (2009).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. This is the federal code in which the government prosecuted Lori
Drew in the MySpace death of Megan Meier. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452
(2009).
97. SMITH, supra note 93, at 11 n.60.
98. Matthew C. Ruedy, Repercussions of a MySpace Teen Suicide: Should AntiCyberbullying Laws Be Created?,9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 323, 331-32 (2008).
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of anonymous online bullies who violated the constitutional liberties of
others to be free from torment and bullying on the Internet. Because
existing laws did not satisfactorily address cyberbullying, 34 states have
now enacted "cyberbullying" laws in order to better protect minors
from online bullying or harassment.9 9
As cyberbullying has become a widespread and pervasive issue
across the United States, states have in turn enacted legislation to
combat these virtual crimes. 00 The majority of these state laws
effectuate sanctions for all forms of cyberbullying which occur on
school property, as well as at school-sanctioned events and activities. 01
Additionally, some of these state laws also extend the reach of sanctions
to cyberbullying activities that originate off-campus. 1 02 This is done
with the realization and understanding that off-campus activities can
have a chilling and disruptive effect on a child's learning environment
within the school walls. Currently, the penalties for cyberbullying range
from parent interventions to school suspensions to criminal prosecution
of misdemeanors and felonies.103
Before addressing the specific details of newly enacted state anticyberbullying legislation, it is important to have an overview of the
spectrum of state laws and wide variety among them. As of this writing,
all fifty states now have some form of "cyber" laws on the books, but
the statutes varygreatly, and some do not even refer to electronic
Nebraska's cyberstalking and cyberharassment
communications.
statutes, for example, only refer to communications, and do not directly
refer to communications over the Internet or communications in the
electronic medium.' 0 5 As a result of omitting any reference to the
Internet or electronic medium, it is plausible that an Internet aggressor
may avoid prosecution under this statute by stating the statute is too
narrow and, while being strictly construed as a criminal law, does not
cover the culprit's cyberbullying behavior on the Internet through an
99. Nat'1 Conference of State Legislatures, State Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment, and
Cyberbullying Laws, Dec, 13, 2010, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13495 [hereinafter
NCSL].
100. See id. While outside the purview of this Article, it is important to note the
differences between cyberbullying, cyberstalking, and cyberharassment. Cyberstalking is the use
of the Internet, e-mail or other electronic communications to stalk, and generally refers to a
pattern of threatening or malicious behaviors. Cyberharassment differs from cyberstalking in
that it is generally defined as not involving a credible threat. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. See generally Todd B. Erb, A Casefor Strengthening School DistrictJurisdiction
to Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257 (2008).
105. Kate E. Schwartz, Criminal Liability for Internet Culprits: The Need for Updated
State Laws Covering the Full Spectrum of Cyber Victimization, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 407, 416
(2009).
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electronic medium. Arizona is another example of a state that has
potentially limited itself in its legislation construction. In Arizona, under
their cyber victimization law, a person who "contacts . . . or causes a
communication with another person by verbal, electronic . .. or written

means in a manner that harasses" may be punished.106 As may be
deduced from this statute, there is no requirement of reasonable fear on
the part of the victim, and hence, no felony punishment. 0 7 Therefore, a
stalker may tow the fine line of stalking while not causing reasonable
apprehension in the victim and therefore avoid a severe felony charging
if there is no reasonable fear induced by the victim.
While states such as Nebraska and Arizona may have enacted
specific express language in their cyberbullying laws, other states have
arguably enacted overbroad cyberbullying laws which group many
types of behavior into a single act and punishment.' 0 Kentucky's
cyberbullying law, for example, convolutes cyberbullying, and
cyberharassment actions by incorporating them into a single act and
single punishment. 0 9 Kentucky's law criminalizes any action through
electronic communication that intends to intimidate, harass, bully,
annoy, or alarm another person. 10 In contrast, Florida maintains distinct
statutes for cyberstalking and cyberbullying with the former carrying a
higher mens rea and a stiffer criminal penalty when compared to
cyberbullying."' As may be seen in the chart below, Kentucky has only
one cyber victimization law on the books but attempts to use this
overbroad and over-inclusive law as a criminal determent to prohibit
many kinds of electronic communications beyond mere cyberbullying.
Accordingly, there is a risk of over-criminalization when no law on
point exists for the specific conduct that is attempted to be proscribed.
The table below illustrates the 50 states and their recent actions to
combat cyber victimization, including cyberbullying.112
State/Territory
Alabama

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Cyberstalking

Cyberharassment
Ala. Code

§ 13A-l 1-8

Cyberbullying
Ala. Code
3(2)

§ 16-28B-

Id. at418.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 419.
Id.; see also Charlotte Chang, Internet Safety Survey: Who Will Protect the

Children?,25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501 (2010) (noting Texas law).
111. Compare FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (2009), with FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2009).

112. Cyberbullying and cyberharassment are sometimes used interchangeably, but for the
purposes of this chart, cyberbullying is used to mean electronic harassment or bullying between
minors within the school context. NCSL, supra note 99. This chart identifies only state laws that
include specific references to electronic communication.

State/Territory
Alaska
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Cyberharassment

Cyberstalking
Alaska Stat.

Cyberbullying

§§

11.41.260, 11.41.270

Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Arizona

§ 5-41-108

Arkansas

Ark. Code

California

Cal. Civil Code §
1708.7, Cal Penal
Code § 646.9

Colorado

Colo. Rev. Stat.
602, 18-9-111

§ 13-2921

§ 5-41-108

Ark. Code

Cal. Penal Code
653.2, 653m

§§ 422,

32-109.1 (2)(a)(X)
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a182b, 53a-183

Delaware

Del. Code tit. 11

§ 784.048

Fla. Stat.

Georgia

Georgia Code
90

Fla. Stat.

§ 784.048

Idaho Stat. §§ 187905, 18-7906

Illinois

720 ILCS

§§ 5/12-

720 ILCS

Fla. Stat.

§§ 135/1-2,

§ 1006.147

Ind. Code

Iowa

Iowa Code

Idaho Stat.

§ 18-917A

105 ILCS

§§ 5/27-13.3,

5/27-23.9

§708.7

Iowa Code

§ 208.28

Kan. Stat. § 72-8256

§21-3438

Ky. Rev. Stat.
525.080(1)(c)

Kentucky

730(11)

Laws, Ch. 685, sec. 3)

§

La. Rev. Stat. §§
14:40.2, 14:40.7,
Children's Code Art.

La. Rev. Stat. §§
14:40.2, 14:40.3

Me. Rev. Stat. tit 17A
210A (see 2007 Me.

§ 20-2-

§ 35-45-2-2

Indiana

Maine

§

§ 711-

135/1-3, 135/2

7.5, 740 ILCS 21/10

Kan. Stat.

Del. Code tit. 14
4112D

Georgia Code
751.4
Hawaii Rev. Stat.
1106

Idaho

Louisiana

§ 1311

§ 16-5-

Hawaii

Kansas

Cal. Ed. Code §§
32261, 32265, 32270,
48900

§§ 18- Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-

Connecticut

Florida

§ 6-18-514

Ark. Code

§
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Maryland

Cyberharassment

Cyberbullying

§ 3-805

Md. Code, Ed. Law
424, 7-424.1

Md. Code tit. 3

Massachusetts

Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
265 § 43

Michigan

Mich. Comp. Laws
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Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265
43A

§ Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71
§ 370

§§ Mich. Comp. Laws §

750.411h, 750.411i

750.411s

Minnesota

Minn. Stat. § 609.749

Minn. Stat.

Mississippi

Miss. Code §§ 97-45- Miss. Code
15, 97-45-17, 97-3-107

Missouri

Mo. Rev. Stat. §
565.225

Montana

Mont. Code Ann.
5-220

§ 609.795

Minn. Stat.
121A.0695

§ 97-29-45

Miss. Code §§ 37-1167, 37-11-69

§ 565.090

Mo. Rev. Stat.

Nev. Rev. Stat.
200.575

N.H. Rev. Stat.

N.C. Gen. Stat.
196.3

§

Neb. Rev. Stat.
2,137

§ 79-

Nev. Rev. Stat.
392.915

§

N.H. Rev. Stat.
F:2 et seq.

§§ 193-

N.J. Stat. §§ 18A:37-14,
18A:37-15.1
New York Penal Law
240.30

§

§§ 14- N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-196(b) N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14458.1, 115C-407.15-17
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-1707

North Dakota
Ohio

Ohio Rev. Code
2903.211

Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. tit. 21
§ 1173

Oregon

Or. Rev. Stat.

Pennsylvania

§ 644:4

N.J. Stat. § 2C:12-10,
2C:12-10.1

New York
North Carolina

Mo. Rev. Stat.
160.775

213

§

New Hampshire
New Jersey

§

§ 45- Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-

Nebraska
Nevada

§ 7-

§

§§

Ohio Rev. Code §§
2917.21(A), 2913.01(Y)
Okla. Stat. tit. 21
Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 1172

§ 166.065

Okla. Stat. tit. 70 § 24100.4
Or. Rev. Stat.

163.730 to 163.732

§ 339.351

Pa. Cons. Stat. tit. § 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. tit. 18 §

24 P.S. § 13-1303.1-A

et seq.
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State/Territory

Cyberstalking
2709.1

Rhode Island

Cyberharassment

Cyberbullying

2709(a), 2709(f)

R.I. Gen. Laws
52-4.2

§ 11-

§ 11-52-4.2 R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-21-

R.I. Gen. Laws

26

South Carolina

S.C. Code §§ 16-3S.C. Code §§ 16-3S.C. Code §§ 59-63-110
1700(C), 16-3-1700(F) 1700(B), 16-3-1700(C), 16- to 59-63-150
17-430

South Dakota

S.D. Cod. Laws
19A-1

Tennessee

Tenn. Code
315

§ 22-

§ 39-17-

Texas

S.D. Cod. Laws
Tenn. Code

§ 39-17-308

Tx. Penal Code

§ 76-5-

Utah

Utah Code
106.5

Vermont

Vt. Stat. tit. 13
1061,

§§

Utah Code

§ 49-31-31

§ 33.07

§ 76-9-201

Vt. Stat. tit. 13

§ 1027

1062, 1063

Virginia

Va. Code § 18.2-60

Va. Code

§ 18.2-152.7:1

Washington

Wash. Rev. Code §§
9A.46.110, 9.61.260

Wash. Rev. Code §§
9A.46.020, 10.14.020

West Virginia

W. Va. Code

Wisconsin

Wis. Stat.

Wyoming

Wyo. Stat.

Va. Code

§ 22.1-279.6

Wash. Rev. Code
28A.300.285

§

§ 61-3C-14a

§ 947.0125

§ 6-2-506

Wyo. Stat. §§ 21-4-311
to 21-4-315

Territories:
Guam

X.G.C.A. tit. 9
19.69, 19.70

§§

X.G.C.A. tit. 9

§§ 19.69,

19.70

B. FloridaTakes Action; "The Jeffrey Johnston Stand Up for All
Students Act"
Jeffrey Johnston was a student who attended public schools in the
State of Florida." 3 While attending school, Jeffrey was constantly
bullied in person and through Internet communications for three
years.' Eventually, the bullying became to be too much, and at the age

113. JeffreyJohnston.org, http://www.jeffreyjohnston.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
114. See id.

164

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[Vol. 16

of fifteen Jeffrey took his own life.' 15
In April 2008, Florida Governor Crist signed into law Florida Statute
§ 1006.147, also called the "Jeffrey Johnston Stand Up for All Students
Act" (Johnston Act).1 6 The Johnston Act prohibits bullying and
harassment in Florida public schools for the grades of kindergarten
through twelfth grade.' 7 Additionally, this law protects public school
students and employees and requires public schools to adopt and
implement measures and policies to protect and safeguard students and
employees from physical and emotional harm from cyberbullying." 8 If
a state school fails to comply with the Johnston Act, the school risks
losing state educational funding." 9 The Florida Senate has stated in
formal session that spreading false rumors or online attacks that puts a
student in reasonable fear or harm, or which is sufficient to interfere
with the student's school performance is enough to qualify as
cyberbullying in Florida.' 20 The law also has a good faith immunity
clause. Students, parents, volunteers, or employees who in good faith
report cyberbullying will be exempted and immune from civil causes of
action against them.121 The Johnston Act mandates that each school
district in the State of Florida adopt and implement the Johnston Act
requirements by December 1, 2008.
The Johnston Act seeks to address and prevent actual bodily harm,
reasonable fear of bodily harm, actual property damage, reasonable fear
of property damage, substantial disruption of orderly operation of the
school, and substantial interference with a student's access to
educational benefit, of a public school student within the State of
Florida.123 Furthermore, the Johnston Act seeks to reach cyberbullying
which occurs while the culprit is in school, on school property and at
school-sponsored activities and events whether or not on school
property.124 It also addresses cyberbullying that occurs through
computer, computer system, network, or electronic technology of a
115.

Id.; Martha L. Arias, Internet Law-Bullying and Cyberbullying Prohibited Under

Florida Law, INTERNET Bus. L. SERVICES, Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.ibls.com/intemetlaw

news_portal view.aspx?id=2109&s=latestnews [hereinafter IBLS].
116. IBLS, supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. Id. See also Andrew M. Henderson, High-Tech Words Do Hurt: A Modern Makeover
Expands Missouri's HarassmentLaws to Include Electronic Communications, 74 Mo. L. REV.
379, 389 (2009).
119. ABC, supra note 92.
120.

FLA. STAT.

§

1006.147 (2009).

121. IBLS, supra note 115.
122. Id.
123. Colleen Barnett, Note, Cyberbullying: A New Frontierand a New Standard:A Survey
of and Proposed Changes to State Cyberbullying Statutes, 27 QUINNIPIAC. L. REV. 579, 623
(2009).
124. Id. at 624.
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schools district, and off-campus speech if it substantially disrupts
orderly operation of the school.1 25 Additionally, under the Johnston Act,
Florida public schools must follow up on reports of cyberbullying by,
inter alia, contacting the parents of all students involved and
documenting the incident. 126 The Johnston Act, however, does not
prohibit cyberbullying in school vehicles, designated bus stops, or
grounds immediately adjacent to school grounds. '27 As of this writing,
thirty-four states currently have anti-cyberbullying statutes on the
books, but Florida is only one of two states to penalize schools that do
not comply with statutes. 28
1. The Exception: Private Schools
It is important to take note the Johnston Act only applies to public
schools. Section 1006.147(2), Florida Statute, states "[b]ullying or
harassment of any student or employee of a public K-12 educational
institution is prohibited." 29 Furthermore, it is important to highlight
some of the fundamental differences between private and public school
in the State of Florida. Private schools on the elementary and secondar
levels are not licensed or regulated by the Department of Education.
Furthermore, Florida private schools institute their own systems of
school accountability and discipline.'31 Most importantly, however,
private schools are not subject to school requirements specified in
educational state statutes and are not under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Education of the State of Florida because the Johnston
Act is controlled and tied to public funding.' 32
As of the writing of this Article, there are 2,587,554 public school
students within 3,629 public schools in the State of Florida.' 3 There
are approximately 339,582 private school students within 1,713 private
schools in the State as well.134 While the ratio is approximately every
7.62 public school students to 1 private school student, there are still a
total of 2,927,136 Florida students in kindergarten through twelfth
grade, with 11.6% of these Florida students attending private schools
125. Id.
126. ABC, supra note 92.
127. Id.; Barnett,supra note 123.
128. ABC, supra note 92; see NCSL, supra note 99.
129. FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2009) (emphasis added).
130. Fla. Dep't of Educ., Choosing a PrivateSchool in Florida, http://www.floridaschool
choice.org/Information/PrivateSchools/choosinga_private-school.asp (last visited Mar. 15,
2011).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Education Bug, Welcome to the Florida Public School Directory, http://florida.
educationbug.org/public-schools/?subdomain=florida (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
134. Id.
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and arguably out of the purview of the Johnston Act. Other ambiguous
limitations within the Johnston Act are Sections 1006.147(2)(a), (b),
and (c) which state the following: that the cyberbullying or harassment
must be "[d]uring any education program or activity ... during any ...
school-sponsored program on a school bus of a K-12 educational
institution; or ... [t]hrough the use of data or computer software that is
accessed through a computer, computer system, or computer network of
a public K-12 educational institution."l 35 These are very limiting
sections of the Johnston Act. Are the actions of a cyberbully who sits at
home accessing Facebook or MySpace and insults other youths covered
under the Johnston Act? The answer seems to be no, unless the
cyberbully is doing so at a school-sponsored event or accesses a
computer network of a K-12 educational institution-which is very
unlikely.
2. The Unknown: What are the Penalties?
One of the founding principles of criminal law is to deter future
unlawful conduct. The Johnston Act also goes into intricate detail over
the reporting system school districts must implement to account for and
report cyberbullying. Overall, the Johnston Act has over nineteen
However, it contains no proscription or express
requirements.
if the Johnston Act is violated.
penalties
for
language
In reality, and in practical use, what is the purpose of the Johnston
Act? While the Johnston Act is a well-intentioned step in the right
direction to combat cyberbullying, the authors feel the Johnston Act
lacks the teeth it needs, and deserves, to truly be effective within and
outside the educational landscape. In stark contrast to other state
cyberbullying laws across the country, the Johnston Act does not
impose any criminal penalties or any other express discipline for
violation of the Act.' 3 8 Because the Johnston Act contains no penalties,
questions arise as to the proper consequences that will need to be
imposed upon a student who violates the Act. Should a violation of the
Act merely include school punishment, such as a detention? Or does a
violation of the act require that further and subsequent criminal action
must be sought by the state beyond merely school discipline? 39 As the
Johnston Act is used, challenged, and applied, court sanctions for
violation of this Act will most likely be determined on a case-by-case
135. FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(2)(a)-(c) (2009).
136. See FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2009).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Cara J. Ottenweller, Cyberbullying: The Interactive Playground Cries for a
Clarificationof the CommunicationsDecency Act, 41 VAL. U.L. REV. 1285, 1293 (2007).
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basis.
It is apparent that the Johnston Act reflects a trend toward school
districts as the policy enforcers of cyberbullying misconduct within the
state of Florida. However, it is also important to discuss Florida Statute
784.048, which proscribes cyberstalking and cyberharassment.1 40
Perhaps because cyberbullying, by its definition in Florida, must include
two minors, cyberstalking and cyberharassment may be seen as more
serious crimes by the Florida legislature because of the adult conduct
and nature of the crimes. Accordingly, unlike the Johnson Act, the
cyberstalking and cyberharassment statute expressly provides penalties
from a misdemeanor in the first degree through a felony in the third
degree.141 In contrast, the Johnston Act, which exclusively governs
cyberbullying, has no such language in the statute to lay out criminal
sanctions to guide future prosecuting attorneys and state courts.14 As a
result, what the Johnston Act does is establish a weak criminal law
which ultimately redirects responsibility of policing the Act upon public
schools without articulating penalties for violation of the Act. Thus,
public schools are expected to prevent cyberbullying by their students
without the support of any state criminal sanctions.
V. CYBERBULLYING AS A FEDERAL CRIME
A. The Megan Meier Cyberbullying PreventionAct
1. The MySpace Suicide
Megan Meier, of Dardenne Prairie, Missouri, was born November 6,
1992.1 From the third grade on, Megan was under the care of a
therapist and diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and depression.144
In 2006, as the facts came to light, the daughter of a woman named Lori
Drew and Megan had an on a ain and off again relationship which
ultimately ended in turmoil. 14 As the two young girls separated,
animosity rose between the two. 146 Through an online account on the
140. FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (2009).
141. Id.
142. FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2009).
143. Megan Meier Found., Megan Meier's Story, http://meganmeierfoundation.cwsit.org/
megansStory.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2011); Megan Meier, http://www.mahalo.com/meganmeier/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
144. See Christopher Maag, When the Bullies Turned Faceless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/fashion/16meangirls.html?ref-megan
meier; Megan Meier's Story, supra note 143.
145. Megan Meier's Story, supra note 143.
146. See Ryanick Paige, The Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/i824371/themeganmeiercyberbullying_preventio
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social networking site MySpace, Lori Drew (who lived four houses
away from Megan Meier), created a fictitious MySpace profile of a boy
named Josh Evans. 147 The fagade account was created by Lori Drew for
the purpose of retaliatinF against Megan for allegedly spreading gossip
about Drew's daughter. Among other messages, one of the e-mails
from "Josh" stated, "You are a bad person and everybody hates you.
Have a shitty rest of your life. The world would be a better place
without you."' 4 9 In response to the repeated distressing e-mails sent by
Drew through MySpace, Megan committed suicide by hanging herself
three weeks before her fourteenth birthday.s 0 Lori Drew was ultimately
charged and convicted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA)15 1 because of her cyberbullying acts against Megan, but her
conviction was dismissed by the court because the State failed to prove
Lori Drew's actions directly caused Megan's suicide (a crucial
causation element in the statute).152 It is pertinent to note that Lori Drew
was prosecuted under the CFAA because no federal cyberbullyin
legislation on point had been created or enacted at that point in time.
In relevant part, the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), the statute under
which Lori Drew was prosecuted, states, "[w]hoever intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,
and thereby obtains information from any protected computer" may be
punished by fine or imprisonment, or both. 4 In sum, because there was
no relevant cyberbullying statute on point, Lori Drew was only
convicted of violation of MySpace terms agreement.'
In response to this episode, the Federal Megan Meier Cyberbullying
Prevention Act (Meier's Law) was re-introduced to Congress on April
2, 2009, by U.S. Representative Linda Sdnchez. 156
In relevant part, Meier's Law states:
(a) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication, with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or
n.html?cat-17 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
147. Id.; see also United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449,452 (2009).
148. Paige, supra note 146.
149. Megan Meier's Story, supra note 143.
150. Id.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
152. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 453.
153. The Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act was not introduced until May 22,
2008. OpenCongress, H.R.6123: Megan Meier Cyberbullying PreventionAct, http://www.open
congress.org/bil l 10-h6123/show (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
154. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), (c); see Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451.
155. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451-53; Schwartz, supra note 105, at 424.
156. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
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cause substantial emotional distress to a person, using electronic
means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
(b) As used in this section(1) the term "communication" means the electronic transmission,
between or among points specified by the user, of information of
the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the
information as sent and received; and
(2) the term "electronic means" means any equipment dependent
on electrical power to access an information service, including
email, instant messaging, blogs, websites, telephones, and text
messages.1 5 7
Meier's Law was designed to set a standard federal definition for the
term "cyberbullying" by defining that the cyberbullying behavior must
be repeated, hostile, and severe in order to fall under the definition of
cyberbullying within the Law. 1s According to the text of Meier's Law,
and unlike Florida's Johnston Act, individuals who cyberbully others
via any electronic means could face fines, two years in prison, or
both.' 5 At its core, Meier's Law looks at three elements of the
cyberbullying act in order to fall under its jurisdiction: (1) the required
mens rea of the cyberbully; (2) the mandatory use of electronic means
of communication; and (3) that the communications were severe,
hostile, and repeated.160
2. Walking the Fine Line-The First Amendment and Free
Speech Rights
Was the Megan Meier occurrence an anomaly? Is federal legislation
necessary for what usually amounts to local matters? In the case of
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,161 the Supreme Court
demonstrated that the First Amendment protects the right to speak
anonymously.162 There is no doubt free speech is fundamental to our
157. Id.
158. Id. Along with prosecuting under the Megan Meier Law, other remedies of
prosecution such as defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and harassment are
available.
159. Jacqui Cheng, Trolling Someone Online? Bill Would Slap You With Jail Time, ARS
TECHNICA, May 10, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/05/trolling-someoneonline-bill-would-slap-you-with-jail-time.ars.
160. Id. See also Wes Finley-Price, Bill Could Mean Jail Time for Internet Flamers,CNN
SciTECHBLOG, May 12, 2009, http://scitech.blogs.cnn.com/2009/05/12/bill-could-mean-jail-forinternet-flamers/.
161. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
162. Sarah Jameson, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech and
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way of life, but it also comes with responsibilities. However, due to the
historic lack of government regulation over the Internet, an extremely
broad reading of free speech has resulted.16 3
In light of these questions and the above mentioned case law, it is
worth noting that Meier's Law has been met with resistance from free
speech advocates. Inter alia, speech advocates note the language of
Meier's Law is too broad and that it would act as a judge and jury to
determine whether there is enough evidence to prove one person
cyberbullied another.164 Also noting the Law's vague language,
opponents note the Law was created and intended to protect minor-onminor cyberbullying, but the act does not contain such language and
presumably applies to adults as well.16 5 Furthermore, opponents argue
cyberbullying is a state matter and cyberbullying prevention should not
have become a federal mandate.166
Arguably Meier's Law could criminalize any online communication
done "with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial
emotional distress to a person" and potentially implicate those who
enjoy engaging in "trolling" or "flaming" 167 on message boards.16 8
However, when anonymity is used as an advantage to defame, libel, and
emotionally distress a person in the virtual world, the First Amendment
should step aside to common sense, decency, and justice. In cases of
cyberbullying, law enforcement and the courts should retain the ability
to pierce the veil of anonymity if and when the law and circumstances
require.
In sum, opponents state the federal government should not and
cannot legislate against "meanness" in the form of violating free speech
in open online forums.169 This argument misses the mark.170 Overall,
Meier's Law creates a strong framework for states to work from,
whereas many states are currently working in a vacuum.
Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 239 (2008).
163. Id. at 264.
164. Steven Kotler, Cyberbullying Bill Could Ensnare Free Speech Rights,
FoxNEWS.COM, May 14, 2009, availableat http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/14/cybe
rbullying-ensnare-free-speech-rights/.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. "Flaming" is a hostile and insulting interaction between Internet users. "Trolling" is
the attempt to get others to flame. BBC-h2g2-Flaming and Trolling, http://www.bbc.co.uk/dnal
h2g2/Al082512 (last visited Mar 15, 2011).
168. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
169. Kotler, supranote 164.
170. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
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B. The Hypothetical;Application of the Johnston Act and Meier's Laws
1. Facts
An afternoon three years ago, before the Johnston Act or Meier Law
were enacted, a mother at her job received a telephone call from the
middle school principal from her daughter's school in Palm Beach
County, Florida. The principal stated her sixth grade daughter, Brianna,
engaged in cyberbullying and requested the parent to come to the school
immediately. Distraught, the mother immediately went to the middle
school to confront her daughter. As it turns out, in fact, Brianna had
created a fake Facebook page about another middle school student
named Hali. The page repeatedly stated derogatory things regarding
Hali such as she is a "whore" and she "should get beat up and go kill
herself" Needless to say, Hali and her family were extremely
distressed. Hali was constantly teased in and out of school, and before a
few weeks passed, her self-esteem dropped, along with her grades, and
the Facebook page had over one hundred posts and over one hundred
"friends." A week later, Hali committed suicide.
2. Application Under Florida's Johnston Act and Meir's Law
Among other proscriptions, the Johnston Act states spreading rumors
or attacks online that puts a student in reasonable fear or harm, or which
are sufficient to interfere with the student's school performance, is
enough to qualify as cyberbullying in Florida.' 7' Under the facts
mentioned above, using the default mens rea of knowledge, it is safe to
assume that Brianna created the Facebook page with the requisite
knowledge of what she was doing. Furthermore, stating that someone
should get beat up or kill themselves is a viable threat which seems to
rise to the standard of what the Act proscribes-the threat may be taken
seriously. Furthermore, the Facebook page apparently wounded Hali's
self-esteem and was a detriment to her school performance. While
meeting the requirements to violate the Johnston Act, the school district
will cite and report the act of cyberbullying to the parents, all parties
involved, and file official records with the school district and the
Department of Education. However, with the aforementioned being
said, and with no imposition of penalties expressly worded in the
Johnston Act, what is Brianna's proper punishment under the Act?
What is the ultimate future deterrence for her and all cyberbullies? If
other students see there are no severe consequences for these
cyberbullying acts, the Johnston Act fails to deter cyberbullying and
serve its legislative purpose. Under the Johnston Act, unless the victim
171.

See FLA.

STAT.

§ 1006.147 (2010).
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sues civilly in Florida State Courts and is awarded a judgment, or
requests the State Attorney's Office to prosecute and the State Attorney
does so successfully, there is no precedence, or guideline, for what
sanctions may be imposed by the courts upon Brianna.
Utilizing the same facts, there is a vastly different outcome under
Meier's Law. Under the Meier Law, there must be: (1) the required
mens rea of intent; (2) the mandatory use of electronic means of
communication; and (3) the communications were severe, hostile, and
repeated. In the hypothetical above, it may be inferred that such
comments as labeling a young middle school student a "whore," or
vehemently stating that she should go kill herself, are presumably made
with the required mens rea of the intent to harm another. Furthermore, it
was stated that Brianna had created the Facebook page, thereby
satisfying the element of using an electronic means via a computer.
Lastly, it is a question of fact if the comments were severe and hostile as
they were repeated online; presumably leaving this question of fact to a
jury.
Most importantly, and unlike the Johnston Act, sanctions are
imposed in Meier's Law providing an outline for courts to follow. 7 2
Because Brianna engaged in repeated hostile harassment and
cyberbullying which presumably caused Hali's suicide, Brianna shall
face a fine of an undetermined amount or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both. Directly in relation to the acts express language
regarding the punishment proscribed, the courts, and Brianna, are now
put on notice and given a guideline of what penalties will be incurred,
something the Johnston Act fails to accomplish.
VI. CONCLUSION

Free speech issues among public school students have transferred
from the school classroom to the World Wide Web. The Internet is
dynamic, and as it continues to grow, there is a pressing need to
discourage cyberbullying from the virtual world through a legal
framework. The rate of cyberbullying is increasing and the conduct is
unlikely to end any time soon. The anonymous nature of the Internet
provides a safe haven for cyberbullies to take refuge from their harmful
acts. There is no one technology that will ensure children will not be
victims of cyberbullying. As cyberbullying takes refuge in a public
forum for others to witness, and sometimes even encourage, it is
important that this conduct is addressed and the real and substantial
negative effects cyberbullying has upon its victims are acknowledged
172.
2009).

See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
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and properly addressed by legislative acts. In addition to the school
district and criminal law recommendations this article proposes, parents
need to get involved and educate their children in the nature of civil
discourse and teach problem solving techniques. Perhaps telling a child
to just turn the other cheek is not a remedy for this situation.
Technological advancements such as the Internet and social
networking sites such as Facebook have enhanced the ease with which
cyberbullies may operate with impunity in a faceless online world.
Anonymity allows culprits to state opinions and information that they
would not otherwise divulge, especially to another's face. In sum, if
there is no responsibility for a cyberbully's actions under the Johnston
Act in an anonymous online environment, it is easier for a faceless
culprit to state harmful comments with malicious intentions and
motives. The prevalent use of the Internet by minors, as well as adults,
has rendered Internet victimization an expansive problem in a wide
variety of situations and circumstances.
In light of this trend, school districts need to work with state and
federal laws, and follow a scheme that holds culprits accountable while
also helping victims. Additionally, legislative acts and courts need to
recognize and distinguish degrees of punishment based upon the
severity of the situation as presented by the facts. There is no way
around it; cyberbullying poses a threat to public safety. A law that
balances the needs of an open Internet and free speech needs to be
regulated with a balance to protect Internet users.
In sum, Florida needs to update the Johnston Act and transcend the
Act into a law that explicitly details punishments for those culprits who
intentionally act in a foreseeably harmful way toward victims on the
Internet; and deter such conduct in the future-an act that more closely
mirrors Meier's Law. Florida has taken a substantial step in
implementing cyberbullying laws, but the Johnston Act places too much
responsibility on the school district, not enough on criminal law
establishments, and needs to be updated to impose criminal and civil
penalties when the act is violated-for at least the mere presence of
deterrence. With such additions to the Johnston Act, school officials
will have more confidence when acting to deter cyberbullying activities
because they will know subsequent to their actions taken, punishment
lies ahead for the perpetrators. As for Meier's Law, while the right to
free speech should be upheld, allowing an online user to express his or
her ideas and opinions, those ideas should not be aimed to intentionally
inflict fear in another person.
In our new online world, victims have no safe haven to retreat from
these public malicious acts of cyberbullying. In response to this, expect
the Meier Law to soon be tested in our federal judiciary. The express
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language of the Law will pose a challenge when balanced against the
Constitutional muster of the First Amendment and free speech.

